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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF '"UTAH 
WALTER W. KERSHAW : 
Plaintiff-Appellant : 
vs, : 
TRACY COLLINS 'BANK & TRUST COMPANY Gasp N !,?8641! 
Administrator of the Estate of 
HALLIE LOVE DENNIS, also known as : 
MRS. CHARLES F. DENNIS 
Defendant-Respondent 
BRIEF OF APPELLA NT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This 1 s an action bruuyliL I) plain Li i i -npjie i idnt, W.nter U« Korsiuiw 
against defendant-respondent9 Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Company, as Administrators 
n1" Hit1 csfiil'p ill Hal I u1 ininyr Dennis, I'n HTHVIM' |UHl»Mii(inf* as satisfaction of a 
claim brought against the estate of Hallie Love Dennis for services rendered 
to the said Hallie Love Dennis by plaintiff during the last three years of 
her luie. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Hear. _• was held on January 30, 1976 before the Honorable James W. 
Sawaya, sitting without jury on defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
defendant seeking to dismiss plaintiff1s Complaint with prejudice. 
The Court determined that there was no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and granted defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing 
plaintiff1s Complaint with prejudice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment rendered in the hearing 
below on respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, a determination that 
appellant's claim against the estate of Hallie Love Dennis is legitimate and 
must be satisfied from the assets thereof, and that the case be remanded with 
instructions to determine the value of services rendered deceased. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent's late husband, Earl Dennis, shortly before his death, 
requested appellant to look after and take care of Hallie Love Dennis until her 
death. Responding to that request, appellant rendered services to Hallie Love 
Dennis on a nearly daily basis during the last three years of her life. During 
that period of time, Hallie Love Dennis requested and demanded that appellant 
perform numerous services to her, including the maintenance and supervision of 
her estate and affairs and the performance of numerous errands. 
Hallie Love Dennis during this period of time, not only permitted, but 
requested and demanded all of the services which were rendered to her by appellant, 
but never entered a contract with appellant, written or oral, for compensation. 
Upon the death of Hallie Love Dennis, appellant filed a claim against 
her estate for 2,345 hours time spent over a three-year period at $2 per hour 
and 20,925 miles traveled at 12/6 per mile. Appellant's claim was for services 
rendered covering the preservation of the estate as well as the personal care, 
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maintenance and supervision of Hallie Love Dennis1 affairs. Such claim was 
rejected by the executor of the estate on May 9, 1975. 
Appellant then filed action against respondent in June, 1975. 
Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on January 16, 1976 which was 
granted January 30th. 
From the foregoing Statement of Facts the appellant respectfully 
submits his argument as follows: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A CLAIM MAY BE ENFORCED AGAINST A DECEASED1 S 
ESTATE FOR SERVICES RENDERED TO DECEASED PRIOR TO 
DEATH IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ACTUAL CONTRACT 
To prevent unjust enrichment in the situation where services are 
rendered to one person in the absence of a formal contract, either written or 
oral, the courts have imposed a duty to pay for services accepted on the basis 
of quantxim meruit. Recovering on quantum meruit is based upon a benefit accepted 
or derived for which the law implies a contract to pay. Roane vs. Crow, 209 P.2d 
149 (Cal. 1949). By such there is created an implied contract to pay for services 
rendered an amount which the one reasonably performing deserves for his labor. 
Basing a claim upon quantum meruit brings the action under a class of 
obligations imposed by law without regard to the intention or the assent of the 
parties to be bound. This is done for reasons dictated by reason and justice. 
Carpenter vs. Josey Oil Company, ( C C A . Okl.), 26 F.2d 442 (1928). 
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The deceased in the instant case during a period of nearly three 
years requested, on a daily basis, that the appellant render services to her 
of a personal nature* At page 13 of appellant's deposition the following 
conversation took place: 
Q You said that Earl Dennis had charged you with the 
responsibility of taking care of Hallie, is that correct? 
A That's correct* 
Q How had he done that? 
A Because he called me over on New Year's Day, January 
1st, 1972, to tell me what bad shape he was in physically, 
and he had only a few days to live. And Hallie didn't realize 
it. And he had to have somebody to look after her until she 
died. 
After being so charged and receiving this request of the deceased's 
husband, appellant was continuously requested to render services by deceased 
herself. Appellant's deposition at page 12 states: 
Q And in your claim you say, "together with all of the 
care and maintenance of Hallie Dennis.11 
A With the exception— 
Q And now, you have said that this regards, maybe some of 
the supervision of these other people, is that right? 
A Well, I was with her every day, and she was a gal that— 
well, let's just put the cards on the table. She was the most 
demanding, cantankerous bitch that God ever created, and she knew 
that her husband, Earl Dennis, had charged me with the responsibility 
of taking care of her before her death. And she went out of her 
way to make it miserable with her demands. She'd call four or five 
times a day and demand that I go do this, and that, and I'd tell 
her, lfhire a taxicab." ,fWell, they charge too much money.f! 
And now, she never bought one nickel's worth of groceries. 
She didn't go to a doctor, or clinic, or talk to anybody. She 
didn't do one single thing that she didn't demand I perform that 
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service for her. 
Q Did you take her to the doctors or clinics? 
A I took her every place she went. 
Q Did you take her to the grocery store? 
A No, she sent me to the grocery, and I bought every 
single grocery she consumed from the time her husband died 
until the time she died. She never went to the grocery store 
once. 
Further evidence of service rendered is fpund on page 11 of 
appellant1s deposition: 
Q Did you hire the nurses? 
A I did. 
Q What are their names? 
A Well, I'll give you those. Dorothy Frickey, an experienced 
Practical Nurse who resides at 1249 Glendale Drive. Her telephone 
number is 486-8243. She was employed by me on August the 27th 
for $100 a week on a seven day, 24 hour basis to take care of 
Mrs. Dennis, and she was acceptable to th£ doctors. 
Q Were there other nurses? 
A Yes. She couldn't stand the pressure, and Mrs. Dennis 
was too demanding for her to continue, and so she resigned some 
time in December. And I was successful to secure the services 
of an Adelia Ballaine, 1480 Green Street, telephone number 
487-9419, who worked for $85 a week, 24 hours a day, seven 
days a week until three weeks before Hallie Dennis died. 
Regarding the amount of time in appellant's claim against the estate 
his deposition at page 15 reveals: 
Q All right. And now, if you spent 14 hours a week, this 
would be averaging then two hours a day. What would you do 
during those two hours a day at her house? 
A Well, I had to go to the grocery store once or twice, or 
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three times a day to satisfy this woman. And every errand 
that she wanted I had to do. I took care of paying all of her 
bills, her correspondence. Everything she did. And now, it 
did average more than two hours a day during that year, 
Q How about the other eight weeks that you don't claim 
for here? 
A I wasnft in town. I can't claim it. I wasn't in town. 
Q Who helped her during that time, do you know? 
A Yes, I know. She got her neighbors, and she got: this 
Claudia Wright thatfs named in the deal. 
From the foregoingit is clear that appellant: 
1. Was requested by deceased's husband to look after her; 
2. Was not, therefore, a volunteer or relative, acting by 
love, affection or self seeking; 
3. Was continuously requested by decedent to render services 
to her; and 
4. Rendered services ordinarily subject to remuneration. 
That these services were to be compensated and appellant was not just a volunteer 
is found at pages 14 and 49: 
Q And now, on the schedule that you have attached to the 
claim you have this broken down as to the three and a portion 
of the fourth year that were involved. That is, 1972, 73, 74, 
and five weeks of 75. And you say in each instance that you 
worked so many hours. 
A She consumed that much time of mine. At least that 
much time. 
Q That you really believe that you were working, and not 
performing any kind of a friendly service? 
A No love or friendship involved in this transaction. 
Q You didn't believe that you were doing any kind of a friendly 
act or charitable deed? 
A Well, I'm not going to be that—I felt that I was doing what 
I was required to do, what I was requested to do. It wasn't a 
pleasant job. 
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Then at page 49 the following: 
Q And you definitely did not think of your services, 
whatever you did for Hallie Dennis, as what, maybe, any other fellow 
Mason would do for another Mason1s widow, right? 
A No. 
Q You definitely felt this was not a charitable deed that 
any other churchman would do? 
A No. Nobody else would do it, not tor her. 
Q So you were looking at this entirely as something that 
you were entitled to pay for? 
A I'm entitled to compensation for the services rendered to 
that woman, and the preservation of this estate. 
In Kramer vs. Clark, 121 Wash. 507, 209 P. 688, (1922), an action 
was brought against the Administrator of an estate seeking to recover money for 
services rendered. The claim was based upon a service rendered by a deceased's 
stepson who had made a trip at the special request of decedent to her residence, 
resided with her approximately one week and returned home. No express promise 
to reimburse the stepson for his trip was found by the court; but nevertheless 
the court found that since the decedent had telegrammed her stepson to come to 
Seattle, his following her request rendered her estate liable to pay for such trip. 
In the instant case there is no relationship of stepmother-stepson 
and the continuous request of the decedent over a period of years to have appellant 
render services to her. Under such circumstances a promise to pay for these valuab! 
services, which were rendered with the deceased's knowledge and approval and at her 
request, should be enforced. Enforcement of a promise to pay the reasonable value 
of services is implied where one performs for another with the other's knowledge 
when the latter expresses no dissent or avails himself of the service, irrespective 
of a precedent request. Naegle vs. Miller, 73 Idaho 441, 253 P.2d 233, (1953). 
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If one may be held to a duty of payment without request by availing 
himself of the benefit of services, one who requests such services certainly 
ought to be so bound, and the law in most jurisdictions is in accord. 
The basis for such a view is found in that series of cases which hold 
that, generally, when services are rendered by one person for another and 
voluntarily and knowingly accepted without more, the law will imply a promise to 
pay what the services are actually worth. Gleason vs. Salt Lake City, et al„ 94 
Utah 1, 74 P.2d 1225, (1937); Williams vs. Jones, 105 Kan. 257, 182 P. 392 (1919); 
Hardung vs. Green, 40 Wash. 2d 595, 255 P.2d 1163, (1952). This has been extended 
to claims against a decedent1s estate. 
This rule of law was further explained in McCollumb vs. Clothier, 121 Ut. 
311, 241 P.2d 468, (1952), a case relied upon by respondent below, where the court 
was confronted with an action brought against a defendant to recover compensation 
under implied contract for services rendered and expenses incurred by the plaintiff 
in securing bidders for the purchase of machinery and equipment sold by the 
defendant. The defendant did institute a foreclosure proceedings in another matter 
and had procured judgment. He then asked the trustee in bankruptcy about the 
plaintiff, Mr. McCollumb, as to his trustworthiness. After such conversation, he 
contacted the plaintiff and asked the plaintiff to go to the premises where the 
machinery was and meet two attorneys involved in the purchase of the machinery. 
Plaintiff aided them in checking and inventorying the property and discussing the 
property with some interested persons. 
It was undisputed that the plaintiff had talked to both the attorney, Mr. 
Iverson, and to the defendant, Dr. Clothier, concerning his activities. The fact 
is that plaintiff's work did react to the benefit of the defendant at request of a 
third party, the defendant's attorney. Upon finding of these facts the court said 
that the question of the moment was as to the authorization for the work; 
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"The rule applicable to the situation is contained in the Restatement 
of Agency, Vol. 2 Section 441, 'except where the relationship of 
the parties, the triviality of the services, or other circumstances 
indicate that the parties have agreed otherwise, it is inferred 
that one who requests or permits another to perform services for 
him as his agent promises to pay for them1." Id* at 470. 
In the instant case, work and labor was performed for thadeceased at 
her request, there is no relationship of the parties, triviality of services, or 
any other circumstance which would indicate that services rendered were to be 
rendered gratuitously. In fact the nature and extent of the services obviously 
takes them beyond the realm of the trivial, and the decedent in the instant 
case continuously required the plaintiff to render further services, not just 
permitted them to be rendered. 
Further, the established rule, under these facts was set forth in 
House Estate, Dillenberger vs. Starkweather, 164 Kan. 610, 192 P.2d 179, (1948), 
where the court stated at 180: 
"The burden was, of course, on appellee to prove her claim. The 
decedent received the benefits of services, and they were performed 
with his approval. In 34 CT«J75'«9 Executors and Administrators, 
Section 452, the established rule is well stated: 
fOrdinarily the fact that services were rendered decedent at his 
request or with his approval, raises a presumption that they were 
to be paid forunless the conduct, relationship, or situation of 
the parties is of such a nature as to rebut the presumption1." 
See also Ennis vs. Nusbaum, Adm'r, 90 Kansas 296, 113 P.2d 537. 
In the instant case the decedent's husband charged the appellant just 
prior to his death that he take care of the decedent during the last years of her 
life, manager her affairs, and see that she was taken care of. Had decedent's 
husband outlived her, his estate would have been liable for these services 
rendered at his request. Startin vs. Madsen, 120 Ut. 631, 237 P.2d 834,(1951). 
However, Hallie Love Dennis did not predecease her husband, who had 
charged appellant with duty to see after her needs, and therefore, his estate 
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went to her. His estate, now held by the deceased, is obliged to pay for these 
services. In Startin, supra, the court stated at 836: 
"There was no error in allowing the jury to include the value of 
services rendered to Priscilla Madsen, wife of the deceased, since 
nothing furnished in this case could be construed to be anything but 
necessities, the expense of which her husband1s estate was obliged 
to pay." 
The instant case has as its issue the validity of a claim for services 
rendered to a decedent prior to her death. As such, it is not based upon contract, 
Statutory authority that contracts must be proven in writing, therefore, have no 
application. The law is consistent in every jurisdiction that an implied contract 
to pay the reasonable value of services rendered is created when services are 
given with approval and knowledge. When those services are requested, a con-
clusive obligation to repay for them ought to be created. 
POINT II 
WHEN SERVICES ARE RENDERED TO A DECEASED PRIOR TO DEATH AND A CLAIM 
MADE AGAINST THE DECEASED'S ESTATE, THE CLAIMANT'S BURDEN IS TO SHOW 
THAT SERVICES WERE RENDERED AND THE EXTENT OF THOSE SERVICES 
In an action for unjust enrichment the measure of damages, tfiere there 
is a proper, equitable basis therefore, is the reasonable value of the services 
rendered. Baugh vs. Parley^ 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335, (1947). Baugh, supra, was 
an action to recover the amount of a down payment on the purchase price of real 
property which had been owned by the defendant and for damages for breach of 
an oral contract by the defendant to sell the real property to the plaintiff. 
Speaking merely to the issue of unjust enrishment, the court stated at 337, 
"Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and retains money or benefits 
which in justice and equity belong to another"• 
In so holding, the court required that the benefits be sufficient in 
the plaintiff and not incidental in the defendant. Hallie Love Dennis, for three 
years made daily requests for appellant to perform services for her. Such 
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services were not incidental. When the extent and!nature of these services 
are revealed, justice requires their compensation. 
What appellant must show is the extent olf the services. The following 
is a series of statements by appellant regarding seirvices rendered: at page 22 of 
appellant1s deposition, we find: 
Q Okay. So back to the claim. So your claim for services at $2.00 
an hour is your own evaluation of your worth? 
A No, itfs not my own evaluation of worth. I thought that was a token 
payment. Hell, common labor gets $6.00 an hour and I rendered a lot 
better service than a common laborer. 
Q But if you didn't have any agreement with her then this is for services 
rendered to her which she accepted, is that correct? 
A I didnft have any written agreement with her, and she didn't accept 
or make any contract agreement with me, anymore than I make when I 
employ you as an attorney. 
Further, at page 25, the following conversation takes place: 
Q Did you write all checks for her? 
A I think that the bank statement will show that she wrote a very few. 
I wouldn't say there was over five checks she ever got released and 
paid, that she wrote herself. I wrote all the checks, but she 
signed every single check, except three the day before she died. 
Because I insisted all the bills be paid before she died. I think 
I paid three checks with power of attorney* Remember, I had power 
of attorney all of this time. 
Again, at page 45, appellant makes the following statements: 
Q Do you have any record in a diary, or a day book, calendar, or any 
way of the actual days or times that you spent with Hallie Dennis? 
A No, I don't make an entry every day, every time I spent with 
everything. But I spent time with her every day. 
Q Did you spend time there on Sundays? 
A God, my life wasn't my own the last year, trying to satisfy the demand! 
and desires. And it's a wonder my wife ever stayed with me that last 
year. God, I waan't no good to anybody. 
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Q So that your claim as you set it out is your estimate of 
the time that you spent o n — 
A —-That's a minimum time that I spent, each one of those weeks. 
Q And likewise the mileage was a minimum mileage, maybe? 
A Absolutely, minimum mileage. 
That these services were valuable in preserving the estate was pointed 
out by appellant. 
A Well, letfs turn it around and say if it hadnft been for 
Walter Kershaw there wouldn't be one single dime in that estate to 
haggle about or administer to. Ifm the one wholly responsible 
for having the entire $66,000 of inventory that's filed with the 
court. Now— 
Q Tell me one thing which you did to preserve any one asset 
of the estate? 
A I prevented her from deeding that home to the Christian 
Scientist Church, for which Tracy-Collins received $34,000 in 
cash. She was hellbent on delivering the deed to that property 
to the Christian Science Church. 
Q Then she sould have been subject to being taken advantage 
of, namely the Christian Scientist Church? Right? 
A That's right. And if I hadn't stepped in and catered to 
her and these nurses, and hauled them back and forth, and she'd been 
obliged to pay the nurses' services that she actually obtained between 
August 27th and April 7th that would have cost more money. The cash 
that was on hand when she died, that would have cost at least $25,000. 
And I'm the one that preserved that estate, nobody else involved in 
the situation. 
Now, furthermore, I have been successful in prevailing upon 
Doctors Clark and Lindem, in St. Mark's Hospital not to file claim 
for the amount of monies due them for the difference between what 
she received from Blue Cross and Medicare, and what their charges 
were. And those charges are in excess of $6,000. 
Q You're saying that you asked these doctors not to file a 
claim? 
A I did. I prevailed upon them. I felt they had enough that— 
well, they just sort of agreed with me that they'd overlook filing 
the claims. Now, that's the situation. And those claims are in 
excess of $6,000. 
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In NylUftd yst mfc$n, 94 Cal. App. 441, 271 Pac. 374, (1928), the 
court held that performance for another person of useful services of the type 
and character usually charged for, with the other's consent, raised an implied 
promise to pay the reasonable value of the services by the person served. 
There existed a claim against the estate for services rendered to the deceased 
prior to death. In allowing recovery under implied contract, the court also 
pointed out that because it was a cause of action and under an implied promise 
to pay reasonable value for services, the action was based upon quantum meruit. 
In such instance the court said: 
lfWhen, upon the trial of the general issue in an action upon a 
quantum meruit for services of a domestic character, the 
plaintiff offers evidence showing the facts in which the promise 
to pay may properly be inferred, and also showing the nature 
and extent of the services rendered, the case should be submitted 
to the jury, although no witness expresses an opinion as to the 
value of the services." 
Such holding allows one making a claim against an estate to establish 
by testimony the nature of the services rendered, and then allows the judge 
or jury to determine the value of those services under the theory of quantum 
meruit. The court finally held that because the services performed for deceased 
were extraordinary: 
"Just as stated in the case of Young vs. Bruere, 78 Cal. App. 127, 
248 P. 301, where one performs for another with the other's 
knowledge a useful service of the character usually charged for, 
the latter expresses no dissent or avails himself of the services, 
a promise to pay a reasonable value of the service is implied.ff 
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POINT III 
AN ENFORCEABLE CLAIM MAY EXIST AGAINST AN ESTATE FOR 
SERVICES RENDERED DECEASED PRIOR TO DEATH, EVEN THOUGH 
DEMAND FOR PAYMENT WAS NOT MADE WHEN DECEASED WAS ALIVE. 
Appellant, during the period of time he rendered services for the 
deceased, Hallie Dennis, did not demand payment from her. Appellant's 
deposition, page 50 illustrates: 
Q Did you ever ask her grandson or her granddaughter for any 
compensation for anything that you were doing? 
A No, And they couldn't have paid a penny. They1 re both destitute. 
Q Did you ever make any demand to Tracy -Collins Bank as Trustee 
for Earl Dennis — 
A No, never. 
Q —before Hallie died? 
A No. No. Frank Dutson and I are very, very good friends, and Frank 
knows exactly what I was doing. 
However, formal demand upon a deceased prior to death is not necessary 
for appellant to recover for services rendered to her. McCaffrey v. Cronin, 
140 Cal. App.2d 973, 295 P.2d 587,(1956). In McCaffrey, supra, the court pointed 
out that conduct may determine that compensation is due even without communication 
to that effect between the parties. The court stated: 
"And the case law has established that intention to pay and 
expectation of compensation for services rendered may be inferred 
from conduct where equity requires it as well as from direct 
communications between the parties...The principle was thus stated 
in DeRosier v. Vierra, 109 Cal. App.2d 291, 240 P.2d 660, 662: 
'When services are rendered by one person from which another 
derives a benefit, although there is no express contract or 
agreement to pay for the services, there is a "presumption of 
law11 which arises from proof of services rendered that the person 
enjoying the benefit of the same was bound to pay what they are 
reasonably worth. The doctrine of implied contracts has its 
foundation in the doctrine of unjust enrichment." id. at 591. 
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In the instant case, the rendering of services for three years, 
the traveling of 20,925 miles at the deceased's request, and the spending 
of 2,345 hours giving the deceased personal care and preserving her estate, 
indicate that expectation of compensation was present. 
This view has been reiterated in our own jurisdiction. In Woodridge 
v. Wareing, 120 Utah 514, 236 P.2d 341,(1951), the plaintiff and defendant had 
entered into a joint endeavor to sell ice-making equipment and had consumated several 
sales. Plaintiff, in the absence of an express contract, brought an action to 
recover for services rendered on the doctrine of quantum meruit for the reasonable 
value of the services. The court held that "he who accepts services from him 
who unofficiously performs under circumstances justifying the latter in reason-
ably assuming he would be compensated, must pay the reasonable value thereof." At 34; 
The reason a demand need not be made upon a deceased during life for 
the value of services rendered is also set forth in Western Asphalt Company v, 
Valle, et al.« 25 Wash.2d 428, 171 P.2d 159,(1946),where the court described in 
detail how the presumption for payment arises: 
"To recover for work and labor on the theory of implied 
contracts to pay therefore, plaintiff must ordinarily show 
that the services were rendered under reasonable expectation 
of payment therefore by persons sought to be charged, and with 
such persons1 knowledge that services were being performed 
with such expectation and a promise to pay for services contr-
ary to the parties intention will not be implied, the recipient's 
actual belief as to whether the one performing the service is 
expecting compensation is immaterial, if recipient as a reasonable 
man should have understood that compensation was expected." 
Id. at 165, Emphasis mine. 
The court, in introducing the reasonable man test, further went on 
to indicate that presumption that payment for labor was contemplated arises 
where the kind of labor ordinarily subject to remuneration is rendered and 
accepted with knowledge and consent, in absence of anything in the parties 
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relation to rebut such presumption. 
Appellant is not related to the deceased, the services which he 
rendered were of the type ordinarily subject to payment and are of such 
extreme nature in the amount of time consumed that the recipient's estate 
should be charged with payment therefore, especially when the deceased 
continuously requested the services. 
The same holding is found in O'Shaughnessy vs. Brownlee, 77 S.W.2d 
867 (Mo. 1934). In Brownlee, supra, the court held that recovery may be had 
for services rendered a deceased at his request regardless of whether deceased 
intended to pay. The court stated: 
11
 If a decedent requested some and received the benefit of and 
permitted all, the services which were rendered by a neighbor 
during an eleven (11) year period, and the deced€int,who was 
crippled, stated that he didn't see how he could get along 
without such a neighbor, the estate was liable, even though the 
decedent did not intend to pay.11 
The gift of a ring to appellant by the deceased does not fully 
cover the reasonable value of the services rendered and exhibits an intention 
on the part of Hallie Love Dennis to pay for those services. Her estate should 
be liable for the appellant's claim for the remainder of the reasonable value 
of those services. No demand need have been made upon Hallie Love Dennis since 
she should have understood as a reasonable person, that compensation was 
expected. 
CONCLUSION 
Reliance below by the defendant upon the fact that plaintiff's 
claim must be grounded in contract was ill founded. Authorities in every 
jurisdiction have pointed out, and have clearly held, that the reasonable value 
of services rendered to a deceased prior to death may be recovered from his 
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estate regardless of actual contract. The law of work and labor is in 
agreement• 
Appellant rendered extremely valuable services to the deceased 
during a three year period at her request. Judgement in the lower court 
granting defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement should be reversed and the 
case remanded for hearing on the extent of the services rendered. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ?n*-V. of May, 1976. 
[£(L t^<\ scrTTJ: 
falter R. Ellett, 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Brief of Appellant was 
served on counsel for respondents, James W. Beless, 1011 
Walker Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, by mailing 
three copies thereof in a postage prepaid envelope on the 
20rh day of May, 1976. 
N ^ 
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